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S1/E51: Dueling Rallies in Iran

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コンテンツは Ali Alfoneh によって提供されます。エピソード、グラフィック、ポッドキャストの説明を含むすべてのポッドキャスト コンテンツは、Ali Alfoneh またはそのポッドキャスト プラットフォーム パートナーによって直接アップロードされ、提供されます。誰かがあなたの著作物をあなたの許可なく使用していると思われる場合は、ここで概説されているプロセスに従うことができますhttps://ja.player.fm/legal

On December 30, Tehran witnessed two competing demonstrations emblematic of Iran's polarized political climate: one orchestrated by the regime and the other a spontaneous expression of public dissent triggered by the latest depreciation of the Iranian Rial against the U.S. Dollar. The state-organized rally aimed to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of what the regime frames as "the sedition of 2009," a characterization starkly contrasting with global narratives that recognize this period as the Green Movement uprisings in Iran.

As some may recall, Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009 under contentious circumstances ignited political contention. His rivals, Mr. Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mr. Mehdi Karrubi, contested the election results, sparking mass mobilizations. On December 27, 2009, millions of demonstrators took to the streets, marking a pivotal moment as chants against Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emerged for the first time. In reaction, the regime organized pro-government demonstrations on December 30, 2009, events that the Islamic Republic’s propaganda apparatus celebrated yesterday in an act of political mythmaking.

In contrast, the second rally, as noted earlier, arose organically as thousands of merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar protested the Rial's devaluation against the Dollar. This economic grievance underscores the regime’s persistent struggle with public dissatisfaction fueled by economic mismanagement.

In today’s program, I will analyze the Iranian media’s selective coverage—or deliberate omission—of these dueling demonstrations, alongside a critical examination of the function and symbolism of pro-regime rallies within the broader context of Iranian political strategy and governance.

  continue reading

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Manage episode 458367405 series 3604482
コンテンツは Ali Alfoneh によって提供されます。エピソード、グラフィック、ポッドキャストの説明を含むすべてのポッドキャスト コンテンツは、Ali Alfoneh またはそのポッドキャスト プラットフォーム パートナーによって直接アップロードされ、提供されます。誰かがあなたの著作物をあなたの許可なく使用していると思われる場合は、ここで概説されているプロセスに従うことができますhttps://ja.player.fm/legal

On December 30, Tehran witnessed two competing demonstrations emblematic of Iran's polarized political climate: one orchestrated by the regime and the other a spontaneous expression of public dissent triggered by the latest depreciation of the Iranian Rial against the U.S. Dollar. The state-organized rally aimed to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of what the regime frames as "the sedition of 2009," a characterization starkly contrasting with global narratives that recognize this period as the Green Movement uprisings in Iran.

As some may recall, Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009 under contentious circumstances ignited political contention. His rivals, Mr. Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mr. Mehdi Karrubi, contested the election results, sparking mass mobilizations. On December 27, 2009, millions of demonstrators took to the streets, marking a pivotal moment as chants against Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emerged for the first time. In reaction, the regime organized pro-government demonstrations on December 30, 2009, events that the Islamic Republic’s propaganda apparatus celebrated yesterday in an act of political mythmaking.

In contrast, the second rally, as noted earlier, arose organically as thousands of merchants in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar protested the Rial's devaluation against the Dollar. This economic grievance underscores the regime’s persistent struggle with public dissatisfaction fueled by economic mismanagement.

In today’s program, I will analyze the Iranian media’s selective coverage—or deliberate omission—of these dueling demonstrations, alongside a critical examination of the function and symbolism of pro-regime rallies within the broader context of Iranian political strategy and governance.

  continue reading

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