S1/E47: Does Ayatollah Khamenei Believe His Own Propaganda?

Iran's Gambit

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Exile

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Episode 10: From Refugee to Radical 44:09

2 years前44:09

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44:09

When a young Eva Kollisch arrives as a refugee in New York in 1940, she finds a community among socialists who share her values and idealism. She soon discovers ‘the cause’ isn’t as idyllic as it seems. Little does she know this is the beginning of a lifelong commitment to activism and her determination to create radical change in ways that include belonging, love and one's full self. In addition to Eva Kollisch’s memoirs Girl in Movement (2000) and The Ground Under My Feet (2014), LBI’s collections include an oral history interview with Eva conducted in 2014 and the papers of Eva’s mother, poet Margarete Kolllisch, which document Eva’s childhood experience on the Kindertransport. Learn more at www.lbi.org/kollisch . Exile is a production of the Leo Baeck Institute , New York | Berlin and Antica Productions . It’s narrated by Mandy Patinkin. Executive Producers include Katrina Onstad, Stuart Coxe, and Bernie Blum. Senior Producer is Debbie Pacheco. Associate Producers are Hailey Choi and Emily Morantz. Research and translation by Isabella Kempf. Sound design and audio mix by Philip Wilson, with help from Cameron McIver. Theme music by Oliver Wickham. Voice acting by Natalia Bushnik. Special thanks to the Kollisch family for the use of Eva’s two memoirs, “Girl in Movement” and “The Ground Under My Feet”, the Sophia Smith Collection at Smith College and their “Voices of Feminism Oral History Project”, and Soundtrack New York.…

約 1 年前 21:05

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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's December 22 address on the occasion of the birth anniversary of Fatemeh Zahra had little to do with plight of women, and a good deal to do with regional developments, in particular Syria. He appeared irritated by Israel's "boasting" and "grand standing," assured the Iranian public that Israel was defeated rather than victorious, and expressed hope Israel would be "evicted" from the Middle East region. On the same day, Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, Supreme National Security Council secretary, delivered an interview expressing similar views. Doest the regime, and in particular, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, believe his own propaganda? If his advisers, the likes of Mr. Ahmadian, constantly confirm his worldview, is Ayatollah Khamenei capable of distinguishing between propaganda and reality?

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Iran's Gambit

S1/E47: Does Ayatollah Khamenei Believe His Own Propaganda?

Iran's Gambit

published 約 1 年前

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66 つのエピソード

#Politics #News #Iran #Ali Alfoneh

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Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E66: Pezeshkian Blames Khamenei For Lack of Negotiations With the U.S. 18:51

1 day前18:51

18:51

On March 2, a parliamentary majority impeached Dr. Abdulnaser Hemmati, minister of economy. Defending Hemmati, President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized to parliamentarians that Iran's economic problems will not be solved with the impeachment, and pointed at a different solution: Negotiations with the United States, in the hope of achieving sanction relief. However, he also added that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not allowing such negotiations. In other words, Pezeshkian is directly accusing Khamenei for the hardships Iranians suffer under the U.S. sanctions regime. But today's program begins elsewhere, a conversation with Professor Sadeq Zibakalam of Tehran University, who discusses his understanding of what President Donald J. Trump's real agenda and what he wants from Iran. Next, we will look at the statements from the director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization with regards to ongoing developments in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and finally, Ayatollah Khamenei's latest statements on the United States and President Pezeshkian's defense of former Economy Minister Hemmati.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E65: No Direct Talks with the U.S. as Long as Maximum Pressure Persists 16:11

約 6 日前16:11

16:11

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has recently conveyed contradictory signals regarding the prospect of direct diplomatic engagement with the United States. On January 28, his remarks suggested openness to such negotiations, whereas on February 7, he appeared to reject the possibility. Officials within the Islamic Republic have subsequently interpreted Khamenei’s statements through the lens of their respective institutional interests. In the latest demonstration of bureaucratic politics, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, at a joint press conference with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, stipulated "talks between Iran and the United States are not feasible as long as the maximum pressure campaign remains in effect." This negates Khamenei's February 7 statement. Meanwhile, former President Hassan Rouhani contended that Khamenei’s opposition to direct negotiations is not absolute. Conversely, media outlets aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) underscore that Iran should not anticipate sanctions relief from the United States. Despite these divergent perspectives, there is a broad consensus among analysts that Russia is unlikely to serve as a mediator between Tehran and Washington.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E64: Khamenei Nixes U.S. Negotiations, Rumors of Pezeshkian’s Resignation 23:28

約 24 日前23:28

23:28

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has once again recalibrated his strategic posture concerning diplomatic engagement with the United States. In his January 28 address , he appeared to tacitly endorse diplomatic negotiations with Washington. However, on February 7, Khamenei asserted that engaging in negotiations with President Donald J. Trump’s administration is “neither wise and intelligent, nor is it honorable.” The rationale behind this apparent policy shift remains unclear, though some Iranian analysts speculate it may be a reaction to the presidential memorandum recently signed by President Donald J. Trump. Khamenei’s statements have also fueled speculation regarding President Masoud Pezeshkian’s purported threats to resign, in protest to Khamenei’s opposition to negotiations. The statements have also reignited a contentious discourse in which both proponents and detractors of diplomatic engagement with the United States selectively interpret Khamenei’s remarks to advance their respective political narratives.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E63: Collective Leadership in the Face of Internal and External Threats? 17:03

約 28 日前17:03

17:03

The Islamic Republic operated under a system of collective leadership throughout the 1980s. At the time, this governance structure remained largely unrecognized by external observers, but those with insight into Iran’s political dynamics understood that supreme authority did not rest solely with Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Instead, the Islamic Republic’s decision-making and policy implementation were effectively managed by a quadrumvirate comprising key institutional figures: the head of the legislative branch, Parliamentary Speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; the head of the executive branch, President Ali Khamenei; and the head of the judiciary, Mr. Abdol-Karim Mousavi Ardabili. The fourth figure in this arrangement was Mr. Ahmad Khomeini, son of the Grand Ayatollah, who wielded significant procedural power by controlling access to his father’s seal, thereby formalizing state decrees in his father’s name. This oligarchic configuration not only ensured the continuity of state functions but also reinforced regime legitimacy and facilitated the enforcement of policy decisions. I perceive that the Islamic Republic is once again reverting to a form of collective leadership. While Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may not be physically incapacitated, he appears increasingly insulated from both internal political realities and the broader geopolitical landscape. The heads of the three branches of government, cognizant of Khamenei’s evolving role, seem to be consolidating authority in response to both domestic instability and external strategic pressures. This emergent political arrangement suggests a recalibration of power within the regime, potentially signaling a return to coordinated elite decision-making as a mechanism for regime preservation. Should the Revolutionary Guard cooperate with the heads of three branches of the government, they regime may significantly improve its chances of survival. However, should Ayatollah Khamenei, feel left out by the president, the parliamentary speaker and the judiciary chief, he may use the Revolutionary Guard to counter balance the civilians and thereby undermine the regime.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E62: Renewed Trump Optimism in Tehran 17:45

4 weeks前17:45

17:45

As Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi lays the groundwork for a new round of nuclear negotiations with the United States, and Ali Larijani, senior adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, signals a willingness to offer nuclear-related concessions in exchange for sanctions relief, Iranian political analysts view President Donald J. Trump’s psychology and Republican dominance across the executive and legislative branches as strategic levers to circumvent opposition from U.S. allies critical of Iran and to secure a durable bilateral agreement with Washington.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E61: Khamenei Greenlights Iran-U.S. Talks, Will Trump? 15:34

5 weeks前15:34

15:34

Today's program discusses renewed speculations about direct negotiations between Tehran and Washington, and as before, the two capitals appear out of sync: historically, when Washington was ready to negotiate with Iran, formidable impediments, primarily Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, prevented Tehran to take part in negotiations. Now that Tehran appears most interested, if not desperate for negotiations, President Donald J. Trump is possibly playing hard to get. Framing his authorization within his characteristic anti-imperialist rhetoric, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has officially sanctioned direct diplomatic engagement between the Islamic Republic and the United States. However, Washington appears unresponsive, as inferred from statements by Iranian officials and domestic media discourse.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E60: Consequences of a Potential Withdrawal of U.S. Forces From Syria 10:20

6 weeks前10:20

10:20

Officially, the United States has maintained a military presence in Syria since September 2014. As of December, approximately 900 U.S. troops reportedly remain in Syria - a number which according to the latest reports may be closer to 2000. This military posture could face a rapid reconfiguration with President-elect Donald J. Trump’s impending return to the White House, given his predisposition toward minimizing direct U.S. involvement in foreign military operations. While such a withdrawal is likely to erode U.S. leverage over the emerging governance structure in Syria, it may not significantly shift the strategic balance of power in Syria and the broader Middle East in a way that would generate a power vacuum conducive to exploitation by U.S. adversaries, including anti-American terrorist organizations or the Islamic Republic of Iran.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E59: Leadership Succession & Negotiation with the U.S. 25:43

7 weeks前25:43

25:43

There is renewed speculation about Mr. Mojtaba Khamenei succeeding his father as the leader of the revolution and Iran's head of state. Separatelly, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are engaged in poorly coordinated attempts to reach out to President-Elect Donald J. Trump to prepare the ground for negotiations with the United States. I am not entirely sure the president and the foreign minister are communicating the same signal, let alone the regime in its entirety, including the Revolutionary Guard and Ayatollah Khamenei. The Islamic Republic really needs to coordinate better. Still better, Ayatollah Khamenei himself must communicate with the president-elect.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E58: Mashayekhi on Maladministration 27:42

7 weeks前27:42

27:42

The central government in Iran, whether under the Pahlavi regime or the Islamic Republic, has historically provided institutionalized spaces for experts to engage in debates on technical—and occasionally political—issues aligned with state interests. These platforms, often manifesting as think tanks, policy research centers, and other quasi-official institutions, fulfill several critical functions: First, they channel dissent by allowing critics of government policies to articulate their objections within controlled environments, thus preventing such dissent from escalating into mass mobilizations or street protests against the regime. Second, they serve as a mechanism for the state to gauge the prevailing intellectual currents among elite circles, potentially co-opting and incorporating ideas that align with state priorities. Third, these fora can act as a tool for the regime to coopt members of oppositional elites by integrating them into the bureaucratic or executive apparatus. With the advent of the internet, both opposition groups and the regime have utilized digital spaces to establish new platforms for discourse. Alongside entertainment content such as cooking shows, pet videos, and pornography, these digital spaces occasionally host serious and substantive debates. Notably, the Islamic Republic has refrained from censoring these discussions, likely because entertainment content overwhelmingly dominates viewer attention. From a political strategy standpoint, this ensures that the regime can extract value from these debates without risking significant political activation or mobilization among the broader Iranian public. A pertinent example is the January 11 debate between Dr. Ali-Naqi Mashayekhi, Professor Emeritus at Sharif Institute of Technology (often referred to as Iran’s MIT), who holds a Ph.D. in management, and Seyyed Ehsan Khandouzi from Allameh Tabatabaei University. The two scholars engaged in a critical discussion on the structural and institutional factors underlying the stagnation of Iran’s development, with a particular focus on economic development.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E57: IRGC Commander on Assad's Ineptitude and Putin's Treachery 39:22

8 weeks前39:22

39:22

Commander Behrouz Esbati, the Public Affairs Director of the Joint Force Cyber Command, on January 7 centered his speech on his firsthand observations of the systemic collapse of the Assad regime. Approximately one hour of his speech was published by Tabnak News Agency, an outlet affiliated with Dr. Mohsen Rezaei, the longest-serving Chief Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Commander Esbati's remarks can be categorized into two distinct sections. The first section presents an Iranian perspective on the progressive disintegration of the Syrian regime, including the erosion of military morale and widespread demoralization among the Syrian populace. This portion of his analysis appears to be both credible and candid. The second section, however, where Commander Esbati projects the future trajectory of the so-called 'Axis of Resistance,' is imbued with ideological rhetoric and serves more as propaganda. I have chosen to place limited emphasis on this part of his discourse.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E56: Iranians Connect to the Internet by Starlink 12:06

8 weeks前12:06

12:06

There has always been a correlation, if not causality, between technological innovation and sociopolitical transformation: Gutenberg’s printing press catalyzed the Protestant Reformation, and from his exile in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini famously utilized cassette tape recordings of his sermons to galvanize the Iranian populace against the Pahlavi regime during the 1970s. BBC Persian's radio service too aided the Iranian revolutionaries. The Internet similarly embodies revolutionary potential, a reality that underscores the Islamic Republic’s systematic strategies to regulate and suppress it since Iran's initial connection in 1993. Following Israel, Iran became the second nation in the Middle East to gain access to the World Wide Web in 1993. However, during this nascent stage, Internet usage in Iran was confined to academic research within universities, rendering it inaccessible to the broader public sphere. Concurrently, an increasing number of Iranians began to adopt satellite television as an alternative information ecosystem. In 1994, the Iranian parliament enacted legislation criminalizing the ownership and use of satellite receivers—colloquially referred to as "dishes"—which facilitated access to transnational satellite broadcasts. This legislative intervention was intended to preserve the monopoly of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) as the hegemonic apparatus for information dissemination and cultural programming within Iranian society. Nevertheless, despite state-enforced compliance mechanisms such as law enforcement raids to confiscate satellite equipment and the deployment of advanced signal-jamming technologies, a substantial segment of the population—including members of the political elite—circumvented these restrictions. Satellite television emerged as a parallel media domain, offering alternative narratives that undermined the state-controlled information architecture, thereby challenging the government's capacity to sustain informational hegemony. Back to the internet, initially, Internet access in Iran was restricted to universities and research institutions. However, according to World Bank data, fixed broadband subscriptions in the country surged from 176 in year 2000 to nearly 11 million in 2021. Similarly, mobile cellular subscriptions grew from 9,200 in 1994 to almost 136 million in 2021. An increasing proportion of these mobile devices are Internet-enabled, granting users access to social media platforms. This exponential growth signifies a notable milestone for a developing nation but simultaneously presents profound challenges to an authoritarian regime intent on constraining personal and political freedoms. To preserve its dominance over the digital information ecosystem, the regime has systematically imposed restrictions on widely used platforms, including YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram. Nonetheless, Iranian citizens have adeptly utilized Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to circumvent state-imposed censorship and access restricted content. From the regime’s perspective, this challenge has been further exacerbated by advancements in satellite Internet technology. Increasingly, Iranian users are bypassing government-controlled telecommunications infrastructure by connecting to global satellite networks, such as Starlink, provided by the international aerospace and telecommunications corporation SpaceX. This trend is extensively documented in the Tehran E-Commerce Association’s fourth report on the "State of the Internet in Iran.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E55: Larijani Defends Iran's Track Record in Syria 23:44

8 weeks前23:44

23:44

· On January 1, Dr. Ali Larijani , former Supreme National Security Council secretary, and adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, defended Iran's track record in Syria. It is not known if Dr. Larijani's spin is only meant for the Iranian public, or he delivers the same message to Khamenei.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E54: Foreign Ministry vs. Quds Force Part II 20:53

8 weeks前20:53

20:53

As the Islamic Republic commemorated the fifth anniversary of assassination of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Suleimani, many public figures, who had personal interactions with him delivered lengthy interviews discussing this near-mythical individual. On January 2nd, I discussed former Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with Khorasan newspaper, and today, I'll discuss current Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi's interview. He delivered the interview on January 1, and my translation is based on the partial transcription released by Iran's al-Alam network. As you will see, there are significant differences between Dr. Zarif's account and Dr. Araghchi's, but this is understandable: the former no longer serves as foreign minister, and the latter is and must deal with the Quds Force bureaucracy in his everyday work. Nevertheless, as you will hear, you can always detect signs of inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force, even in the guarded comments delivered by Dr. Araghchi.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E53: Foreign Ministry vs. Quds Force Part I 28:41

9 weeks前28:41

28:41

Former Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with January 1, 2025 edition of Khorasan newspaper not only provides some insights into his relationship with the late Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem, but also into inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force. An audio recording, allegedly leaked to the media in 2021, provides greater insights into how the Quds Force undermined the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic efforts.…

Iran's Gambit

1
S1/E52: Khamenei Commemorates Suleimani 19:45

9 weeks前19:45

19:45

In the history of most countries, some eras appear more glorious than others. And at times, the past appears more glorious than what we expect of the future. This was my sense monitoring Iran's state-censored media today. Addressing the families of martyrs, including the family of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Soleimani, widows of Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, and other affiliated groups, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered a speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of Soleimani's assassination. In his address, Ayatollah Khamenei reflected on the apex of Soleimani's influence, particularly from 2003 to 2020—a period, which coincides with the height of Iranian geopolitical leverage in the Middle East. Regarding future prospects, however, Ayatollah Khamenei’s rhetoric conveyed aspirations and hope but lacked a clearly articulated strategic framework. Clearly, glory was in the past and the future looks more uncertain.…