The Inquiry’s Phase 2 report was released this week, distilling 400 days of evidence and more than three hundred thousand documents. The report concluded the fire which killed 72 people was the culmination of “decades of failure” by government and others in the construction industry. It set out a “path to disaster” stretching back to the early 1990…

In the early hours of the 14th of June 2017, a fire broke out in a tower block in West London. This fire was both a personal tragedy and a national scandal. It began in Flat 16 of Grenfell Tower. Before long, the flames reached combustible cladding and insulation, which had been installed on the outside of the building. Less than twenty minutes lat…

As the sun rises, the local council, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea are responsible for helping families try and find their loved ones and arranging accommodation for those who have just escaped Grenfell Tower. But as the situation spirals out of control, lost keys, “dehumanising” processes and slow support for residents lead to frustr…

When Ed Daffarn opens his door in the early hours of the morning of the 14th of June 2017, he is confronted by a wall of thick acrid smoke. As the combustible cladding and insulation burned, smoke gathered rapidly in the hallways and stairwells of Grenfell. It prevented many residents from leaving their flats - and ultimately, it is the smoke which…

On the top floor of Grenfell Tower, Marcio Gomes and his family are waiting. Outside, the fire has wrapped itself around 3 sides of the building. But Marcio can’t see any of this. He’s relying on the information given to him by 999 call handlers, and they are telling residents they are safest to remain where they are. Marcio has a decision to make:…

In the early hours of the 14th June 2017, the bell in North Kensington’s fire station begins to ring. Firefighter David Badillo assumes it is a routine house fire. He expects that he and his colleagues will extinguish it quickly and head back to the station. But when he ventures inside the tower, David Badillo realises that this fire is like nothin…

When Grenfell resident Ed Daffarn first heard about the multimillion pound refurbishment of the tower, he welcomed it. The estate had, in his view, become increasingly run down in recent years. But as the refurbishment progressed, he says residents felt their voices weren’t heard. Meanwhile architects and contractors selected materials which would …

Why didn't the civil service act on warnings about combustible building materials? You’ve probably not heard of Brian Martin but he’s central to the story of Grenfell. The civil servant responsible for the fire safety section of the building regulation guidance, he has described himself as the “single point of failure”. Kate talks to someone who tr…

A tale of “deliberate and calculated deceit”. Beneath the cladding, a layer of insulation surrounded Grenfell Tower. This too was combustible and on the night of the fire, contributed to how quickly the flames spread. The companies which produced this insulation have been accused of misleading the construction industry about how combustible their p…

How manufacturers sold combustible cladding When Marcio Gomes found out that Grenfell Tower, where he lived, was going to be covered in cladding, he assumed it must be safe. Today we know this material was the main cause of the spread of the fire at Grenfell Tower. The cladding installed on the tower was made by French company, Arconic - it was hig…

How a fire in Scotland in 1999 foretold the fire at Grenfell Tower. In 1999, a dropped cigarette started a tower block fire in a small town on the west coast of Scotland. The building, which had been recently clad in flammable materials, is said to have caught fire like matchwood. This was one of the first signs that combustible materials were bein…

As the world wakes up to news of a fire in West London, questions start about who’s to blame. At 8.30am on the morning of the 14th of June 2017 Karim Mussilhy is searching for his uncle. It’s over seven hours since the fire started, smoke is still pouring out of the top of Grenfell Tower and a toxic smell is hanging in the air. While residents star…

A new 10-part series about the Grenfell Tower fire and why it happened. As the public inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower publishes it’s final report, we’re releasing ten-part series looking into why the fire happened, and how it could have been prevented. For the past six years, a public inquiry has been hearing evidence about what lies behind…

After more than four years, more than three hundred thousand documents, four hundred days of testimony and around £150 million, the Inquiry heard its final evidence. Lawyers for the core participants put forward the arguments they think the chair of the Inquiry, Sir Martin Moore-Bick, should consider as he produces his final report. Lead Counsel Ri…

"I can’t undo the past, but I wanted to be a part of making things better” While the Inquiry has paused hearing evidence, Kate Lamble spoke in depth to Nick Hurd, a former Minister for Policing and the Fire Service and now the government’s independent advisor on Grenfell. She asked about his experiences while in government immediately after the fir…

Toxicologist Professor David Purser told the Inquiry that the rapid spread of smoke was the principal cause of death, and that burning cladding panels and insulation were the main source of this poisonous smoke. The Inquiry also heard closing statements for Module 4, covering the immediate aftermath of the fire. From next week it will turn into an …

This week the inquiry heard closing statements for Module 6, outlining how combustible materials came to be tested, certified and regulated and ended up being installed on the outside walls of Grenfell Tower. Lawyers representing the Bereaved, Survivors and Residents said the Inquiry had exposed fault-lines in the “edifice of government” and anothe…

This week, as we passed the fifth anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire, two expert witnesses levelled a series of fierce criticisms at the building safety regime. José Torero, head of the civil engineering department at a London university, described the competence levels among fire safety professionals as “extremely poor” and called for the Stay…

This week, the Inquiry moved on from examining the aftermath of the fire and began hearing evidence from a series of experts in fire engineering. Luke Bisby, professor of fire and structures at Edinburgh University, described the results of a test on the cladding panels and insulation installed on the tower as the “most shocking experiment” he had …

This week, the Inquiry heard about the confusion, lack of grip and poor communication within Whitehall, as ministers and civil servants dealt with the aftermath of the fire. Nick Hurd was given the initial responsibility for leading the government’s response, despite being only two days into his ministerial position at the time of the Grenfell fire…

This week, the Inquiry examined how central government responded to the aftermath of the disaster while continuing to hear about London-wide emergency response arrangements. The Chief Executive of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea took two days to ask for emergency help from other London councils, after being “leant on”. An email written …

This week, the Inquiry continued to investigate the events immediately after the fire by digging deeper into what happened at local rest centres which were opened to support survivors. An official who volunteered to help with the relief effort described the scene at the largest centre as a shambles, with chaotic scenes, an intimidating armed police…

This week we heard different views from senior managers as to how the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea coped in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. We discovered that the chief executive initially rejected offers of support because he had “great confidence” in the council. And the inquiry heard reports that - on the night after the fir…

The Inquiry continued to hear evidence about the immediate aftermath of the fire. Rebecca Blackburn, a former Contingency Planning Officer for the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, described scenes inside the town hall as “pandemonium”. Her boss told the inquiry he regrets that he didn’t speak up about weaknesses in the council’s emergency p…

This week, the Inquiry moved on from the technical discussions of the building regulations and the role of central government to focus on the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire. Bereaved, survivors and relatives gave emotional evidence about their experiences directly after the disaster, saying they were “treated like criminals” with th…

This week, three politicians gave evidence. Eric Pickles, former housing secretary, told the Inquiry that he could not understand how the government’s deregulation agenda could have discouraged civil servants from tightening fire safety standards, describing this as “inexplicable and unjust”. Stephen Williams, the minister responsible for implement…

This week, civil servant Brian Martin completed his evidence after more than seven days. In his concluding evidence, he said that there were several occasions on which he believed he could have prevented the Grenfell Tower fire from happening. And – almost five years on – politicians appeared for the first time. Two former ministers with responsibi…

This week, senior civil servant Brian Martin continued giving evidence to the Inquiry. As the only person to testify with experience working for both the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Building Research Establishment, the Inquiry learnt about the intricacies and inadequacies of his role overseeing building regulation…

This week, the Inquiry heard from three senior civil servants: Dame Melanie Dawes, the former permanent secretary at the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, said that she had not been informed about the risk of combustible insulation on high-rise buildings and conceded that the department had systemic failings. Brian Martin, a s…

This week, the Inquiry heard about the work culture in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and how Richard Harral, the Head of Technical Policy, was left feeling angry, frustrated and so “deeply ashamed” that he quit three years into the role. The Inquiry also heard from Sir Ken Knight, the government’s former Chief Fire and R…

This week the Inquiry heard from inside Whitehall, as two civil servants, Bob Ledsome and Anthony Burd, gave evidence. It was revealed that the All-Party Parliamentary Group on fire safety chased housing ministers 16 times about a promised revision to the building regulation guidance. And we heard about a briefing that was prepared a few days after…

This week, the Inquiry heard from Debbie Smith, a senior figure in the Building Research Establishment for more than 34 years. She failed to speak up at a meeting with the government two days after the Grenfell Tower fire about the “immediate and present risk to life” ACM panels on buildings over 18 metres presented. And there was a significant mil…

This week the Inquiry heard that cladding similar to that installed on Grenfell Tower underwent a “catastrophic” fire test 16 years earlier. Sarah Colwell, Director of Fire Suppression Testing and Certification for the Building Research Establishment (BRE), described the speed of flame spread as “shocking”. We also heard that the BRE failed to aler…

This week, David Crowder, former Head of Investigation at the Building Research Establishment, told the Inquiry that an investigation into the Lakanal House fire in 2009, was shut down by the Government although it was “fundamentally incomplete”. David Metcalf, the Director of Window and Cladding Technology, explained how confusion over the use of …

This week, the Inquiry heard how the National House Building Council (NHBC) approved Kingspan’s combustible cladding insulation for many years. John Lewis, a fire engineer at the NHBC, admitted that a desire to collaborate with industry was a “corrupting” influence on their actions. It was also revealed that two days after the Grenfell fire, a seni…

This week we heard closing statements for two modules of the inquiry on firefighting. Lawyers for the London Fire Brigade (LFB) and those representing the Bereaved, Survivors, and Residents (BSRs) strongly disagreed over the responsibility of the LFB for the failure to arrange an early evacuation of Grenfell Tower. The lawyer representing one of th…

This week the Inquiry questioned representatives from both the National House Building Council and Local Authority Building Control about the steps they took to restrict or approve the use of combustible materials in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Steve Evans, an NHBC manager, was warned at a conference 18 months before the Grenfell fire…

This week the Inquiry turned its attention to how building regulations were set and combustible materials tested and certified. Lawyers for the bereaved, survivors, and residents accused the government of concealing crucial information from previous fires, and industry bodies of knowingly approving unsafe building materials. Barry Turner, the forme…

Andy Roe, Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, made a series of frank admissions this week. He said the LFB was aware of every single problem that contributed to the Grenfell Tower fire in advance of the night. A former LFB Commissioner, Ron Dobson, also gave evidence. He answered questions on why some of the recommendations that the Brigade co…

This week evidence was presented by former London Fire Brigade Commissioner Dany Cotton, who previously told the Inquiry that the LFB could not have prepared for a fire like Grenfell Tower. This time, she conceded that in the years leading up to the fire, the LFB failed to take on board national guidance that warned how combustible cladding could l…

This week the Inquiry continued to look at how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) trained its Control Room staff to deal with emergency calls. Evidence was provided by Joanne Smith, the Senior Operations Manager in the Control Room on the night of the Grenfell fire, and Tom George, former Assistant Commissioner for Operational Response accountable for s…

This week the Inquiry looked at how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) trained its Control Room staff to deal with emergency calls. Evidence was given by Scott Hayward, former LFB Principal Operations Manager, and Joanne Smith, the Senior Operations Manager in the Control Room on the night of the Grenfell fire. The Inquiry heard how leading up to Grenfe…

This week the Inquiry focused on the London Fire Brigade’s firefighting policies for high-rise buildings. Peter Cowup – former Assistant Commissioner of the LFB’s Operational Policy Department, and Patrick Utting from the LFB’s Operational Policy Team told the Inquiry how the LFB updated their policies in light of fires in South London in 2009 and …

This week the inquiry saw the closing of one module and the beginning of another. The opening statements for module six looked at how local and national policies guided the work of firefighters on the night of the fire. In the closing statements for module three, we heard about how the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the Tenant Manageme…

The inquiry heard evidence from expert witnesses on the London Fire Brigade’s preparedness for the Grenfell Tower fire. Fire safety expert Professor Jose Torero argued that the LFB lacked the technical knowledge which would have allowed them to understand how the fire was behaving. The inquiry also heard from expert witness Chris McGuirk on the LFB…

Paul Grimwood, a fire engineer at Kent Fire and Rescue Service, developed an alternative approach to firefighting in high rise buildings in 2008. The approach allowed incident commanders to assess which of four firefighting strategies - rescue, intervention, containment or evacuation - should be prioritised. Lawyers from the bereaved, survivors and…

This week we learned that a member of the London Fire Brigade’s Fire Safety Team wrote that giving advice on the risks of high rise cladding fires could be the ‘cat out of the bag on this issue’. The inquiry also heard evidence from the LFB’s former director of operations. Dan Brown said that at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire more than 5,000 h…

The “uncontrolled spread of fire across the outside of tall buildings is a significant threat”. The inquiry revealed that weeks before the fire at Grenfell Tower LFB staff wrote a presentation which warned of the risks of façade fires weeks. The inquiry heard evidence from a Deputy Commissioner, Director of Operational Resilience and Training, and …

“The simple fact is that the LFB did know. They knew, and lives could and should have been saved”. This week the inquiry heard new evidence about the management of the LFB and how it trained its staff ahead of the Grenfell Tower fire. A lawyer representing a group of the bereaved, survivors and residents said his clients did not want heroes in the …

“Truly a case of donkeys led by donkeys”. This was how a lawyer for a group of the bereaved, survivors and residents described lead contractor Rydon, the firm of architects Studio E and specialist cladding contractor, Harley Facades. Core participants submitted closing statements, marking the end of the first two sections of Phase 2 of the inquiry …